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A standardized precipitation index is used in a regression analysis to quantify the impact of 
climate change on agricultural productivity in Sahel. I first estimate a Malmquist productivity 
index  and  its  efficiency  and  technical  change  components.  I  further  assess  the  statistical 
significance of the indices by estimating some confidence intervals via a bootstrap method. In 
the second stage of the analysis, I use a Probit model to estimate the extent to which climate 
variables  affect  agricultural  productivity.  It  appears  that  agricultural  performance  has  been 
disastrous in many Sahelian countries from 1970 to 2000. Using a comparable cross-country 
measure of drought, I provide evidence that precipitation variability is constraining  not only 
Sahel’s  agricultural  performance  but  also  its  economic  growth.  War  also  plays  an  equally 
detrimental role as drought in explaining the causes of Sahel’s economic downturn. 
JEL Classification: O13, O55, Q54 











     I: Introduction: Many observers (InterAcademy Council, 2004; FAO) argue that the issue of 
food insecurity is pressing in most African countries. The prevalence of undernourishment in 
five of the eight countries in Sahel is higher than the average of developing countries
1. There is a 
strong belief that the issue of food insecurity will get even more critical in the future because of 
the combination of a high population growth and a sluggish agricultural productivity growth.  
While population growth has sharply declined in Latin America and the Caribbean and also in 
South-Eastern Asia regions
2, it has rather increased in West Africa.
3 With a limited access to 
capital, as the population pressure becomes high, the agricultural development will take the path 
of labor-led intensification
4 (Carswell, 2000 cited by Aune and Bationo, 2008). In Sahel, this 
type of intensification is common as farmers are reluctant to adopt yield-enhancing technologies 
because of the prevalence of risks associated with  drought and pest attacks (Aune and Bationo, 
2008). As evidenced by Figure 1 below, drought has been chronic rather than episodic in Sahel.  

























































































Although the causes of the decline in precipitation are still being debated, the changes in rainfall 
will certainly have a wide range of economic consequences. Africa is seen as the most vulnerable 
continent to the devastating effects of climate change (IPCC, 1998). Moreover, many observers 
(IPCC
5, 2007; Mendelsohn, Dinar, and Dalfelt, 2000) argue that the most direct impact of 
climate variability in African countries is on agriculture because of the importance of the sector 
in their economies.
6 
Yet, little is known about the magnitude of the impacts of climate variability at the country or 
regional level in tropical areas (Mendelsohn et al., 2000). Few economic studies have measured 
the climate sensitivity of African agriculture. Mendelsohn  et al. (2000) employ a simulation 
method using an IPCC forecast of future atmospheric carbon dioxide levels of 2100 to study the 
impacts of climate change on African agriculture. While they find the effects to be different 
across sub-regions within the African continent, they support that all the regions will experience 
some negative effects. West Africa suffers the greatest losses, ranging from 36 % to 44 % of the 
losses for the entire continent. These damages amount between 42 and 60 % of the region’s 
agricultural gross domestic product (GDP). 
Maddison, Manley and Kurukulasuriya (2007) use a Ricardian approach to estimate the effects 
of predicted changes in climate. Their results confirm that the African agriculture is vulnerable to 
climate change. Their estimates suggest production losses of 19.9 percent for Burkina Faso and 
30.5 percent for Niger by year 2050, under the assumption of perfect farmers’ adaptation to 
climate change.  
Kurukulasuriya et al. (2007) use a cross-sectional Ricardian method based on survey data on 
9000 farmers across 11 African countries  to  estimate the impact  of current  temperature and 
precipitation on farm net revenues. They define total farm net revenue as the sum of dryland 5 
 
crops, irrigated crops and livestock activities.   They find that dryland crop farmers are the most 
vulnerable  to  an  increase  in  temperature.  Although  the  coefficients  on  precipitation  are 
frequently not statistically significant, the authors conclude that net revenues for dryland crops 
will increase with more precipitation and decrease when precipitations fall.  
One common problem with the above studies is the proxy used for their climate variables. The 
average annual value of precipitation is a poor measure of climatic change. It has no meaningful 
explanation in a cross-country study as an average precipitation in one country is surely not 
comparable to an average precipitation in another country.  
The second flaw that can be held against the bulk of previous studies is their methodological 
approach which is based on the Ricardian model. The accuracy of the Ricardian approach in 
climate  sensitivity  rests  on  the  assumption  that  land  value  reflects  the  true  value  of  the 
agricultural products. This is a very restrictive assumption because of the well documented fact 
(Deschenes and Greenstone, 2007) of government interventions to distort prices in developing 
countries.  Therefore,  the  quality  of  the  data  on  price  is  questionable.  The  accuracy  of  the 
Ricardian model in its simple form is further impeded by the lack of well defined property rights 
in  Africa  (Vyas  and  Casley,  1988;  Aune  and  Bationo,  2008).  Also,  some  aspects  of  future 
climates may differ from the present, and the Ricardian models will fail to properly incorporate 
the possible effects of adaptations to climate change (Kurukulasuriya et al. (2007). 
Using survey data, Sakurai (1997) analyzes crop production under drought risk and the demand 
for virtual drought insurance in Sahel. His panel data covers the period from 1981 to 1984 with a 
sample of 89 households in Burkina Faso. His model specification is a modified Cobb-Douglas 
function with interaction terms between traditional inputs and a drought dummy variable which 
is  defined  as  a  year  with  precipitation  lower  than  the  long-term  average.  This  is  a  faulty 6 
 
definition of drought. Not only does it rely on a dummy variable to capture the effect of drought, 
but also the term “long-run average” is vague because there is no clear cut off of how long a 
period must be in order to be considered “long-term”.
7 
The reference to a dummy variable as a measure of drought is also used by such authors as 
Thiele (2003). Additionally, other authors such as Le Nay and Jean (1989); Roncoli, Ingram and 
Kirshen (2001); and  Little  et  al. (2006) use the subjective assessment of country  experts to 
construct their drought dummy variable. 
As it is well expressed in Boubacar (2008), one of the flaws that are often held against previous 
impact  studies  is  their  incapacity  to  launch  the  debate  on  the  economic  impact  of  drought 
because  of  their  faulty  drought  measure.  Even  recent  studies  fail  to  accurately  account  for 
drought. For example, Barrios; Ouattara and Strobl (2008) use a weighted mean of annual values 
of temperature and precipitation as their climate variables. Lio and Liu (2008), in their analysis 
of  governance  and  cross-national  agricultural  productivity  difference,  skim  the  role  of 
precipitation. As in many previous studies explaining cross-country agricultural productivity, 
their measure of climate variable is an average annual precipitation. 
Admittedly,  in  both  the  Ricardian  and  the  production  function  approach,  the  use  of  annual 
average values of climate variables such as temperature and precipitation is not appropriate in 
places where rainfall is received only for 3 to 4 months during a year. To better capture the 
impact of temperature and precipitation on agricultural production, one needs to use the values of 
those  variables  during  the  growing  season.  And  with  respect  to  precipitation,  a  comparable 
measure across regions must also be used in lieu of average value. 7 
 
Even after putting aside the issue of the drought variable used in previous studies, the battery of 
theories put forward to account for Africa’s agricultural performance present mixed evidence. 
The theories can be categorized in two groups.  
The first wave of research (Vyas and Casley, 1988; Jaeger, 1992; Trueblood and Coggins, 2003)   
depicts a dismal growth. As recently as 2002, to address the challenge of agriculture and the 
associated widespread food insecurity in Africa, the Secretary General (SG) of United Nations 
(UN) has solicited the Inter-Academy Council (IAC) to provide “technological strategic plans for 
harnessing  the  best  science  and  technology  to  produce  a  substantial  increase  in  agricultural 
productivity in Africa”  IAC (2004). The concern expressed by the SG of UN highlights the 
region’s poor performance in agricultural production. Recently, Aune and Bationo (2008) also 
share the dismal view of the agricultural development in the drylands of West Africa. They 
describe the process of agricultural intensification as climbing a ladder, with different distances 
between different steps. They conclude that the difficulty of the intensification is explained by 
the constraints related to climate, poor soil quality, a distorted market, poor institutions, and a 
lack of infrastructure. 
On the other hand, the more optimistic view of the recovery of African agriculture is shared by 
such researchers as Block (1995), Lusigi and Thirtle (1997), Fulginiti et al. (2004), Pratt and Yu 
(2008). The magnitude of the increase in productivity depends on the study. A common mistake 
with  many  papers  is  that  they  ignore  regional  disparities  within  the  African  continent.  For 
example,  Pratt  and  Yu  (2008)  credited  only  four  countries  for  the  widely  reported  African 
agricultural performance of the 1980s. According to the authors, Nigeria, Ghana, Tanzania and 
Sudan explain 94 percent of TFP growth from 1984 to 1993 in Sub-Saharan Africa. Thus, the 
pattern  of  agricultural  productivity  in  Africa,  as  conveyed  by  the  more  optimistic  approach 8 
 
should  be  vigilantly  interpreted.  As  noted  by  William  Cline  (2007),  the  performance  of  the 
agricultural productivity in Africa as a bloc is mostly driven by Nigeria and Egypt because not 
only do those two countries alone represent the majority of output base in Africa, but also the 
Egyptian agricultural is entirely irrigated using the Nile water. Therefore, the results may be 
biased against countries without irrigated agriculture. For example Cline (2007), in his study of 
country-level agricultural impacts, contrasts his estimates with and without Egypt. He finds a 
decline of 31 percent in the median change in net revenue due to climate change in dry-land 
Africa as opposed to an increase of 24.4 percent when Egypt is included in the sample. Of 
course, critics may argue that he uses a Ricardian approach that includes a linear and quadratic 
terms in average annual temperature and precipitation. 
Undoubtedly,  attributing  the  performance  of  agricultural  productivity  to  improved  weather 
conditions in Africa (Block, 1995) seems to clash with the reality on the ground, at least in many 
countries in Western Africa. IPCC (1996) reports that droughts are locally frequent every year 
and continental crises surface once or even twice every decade in Africa. This view reinforces 
the findings by Sanders, Shapiro, and Ramaswamy (1996, page 8) who state that “since 1968, 
there have been several acute droughts (in Sahel) and rainfall was approximately one standard 
deviation below the long-run normal”. With very few exceptions, Figure 1 shows that the period 
of  1969  and  afterward  is  characterized  by  recurrent  droughts  in  Sahel.  A  semi-arid  zone,  a 
gateway between the Sahara desert and the humid tropical Africa, covering an area equal to 5.4 
million km
2, situated approximately between 12° and 18° North, Sahel has only one yearly rainy 
season, and very often the bulk of the rainfall is concentrated during the months of July-August. 
Numerous studies (Dixon et al, 1999) indicate that irrigation is rare in Sub-Saharan Africa and 
Sahel is not an exception. According to IPCC (1996), only 7 percent of total land is irrigated in 9 
 
the Sahel Region. This absence of irrigation renders agricultural production dependent on rainfall 
and very sensitive to climate variability. The combination of recurrent droughts (see Figure 1) 
and high mean temperature (see Table 2) creates an unfavorable   soil-water balance.
8  
In sum, Sahel faces very high temperatures, chronic droughts, and possesses a very low irrigated 
land.  This is a highly unfavorable agricultural condition, even for developed nations.  
The conflicting views expressed by the existing studies on African agricultural productivity in 
general and the impact of climate in particula r has motivated this paper. I intend to bring into 
consideration factors thus far neglected and whose role should not be overlooked in explaining 
the causes of the decline of the observed productivity losses. In this paper, I use a newly 
comprehensive climate data set to construct a comparable drought index across all countries in 
Sahel with the following three objectives in mind: 
First, I will compute the Malmquist index for the agricultural sector, a measure of total factor 
productivity. The statistical significance of the Malmquist index is assessed using a bootstrap 
method to construct confidence intervals around its values. 
Second, I will use the estimated Malmquist index to analyze the causes of the decline in 
productivity with particular focus on drought and temperature. 
Finally, using annual growth rates of real per capita GDP,
9 and climate variables, I will study the 
link between  economic growth  and chronic droughts. Trends in drought index confirm that 
precipitation has been on a steady decline sinc e the end of 1960s. In a cross -country analysis, 
Barrios, Bertinelli and Strobl (2003) find that rainfall has a significant impact on growth only in 
the African sample. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the methodological framework 
and the data used in this study; section 3 presents the research findings; section 4 extends the 10 
 
analysis to include the impact of drought on the annual growth rates of real per capita GDP and 
real per capita agricultural GDP; and section 5 concludes. 
II: Methodology 
Productivity is a measure of the performance of a production process using several inputs to 
produce one or several outputs. The measure of productivity that involves the ratios of outputs to 
inputs  is  referred  to  as  total  factor  productivity  (TFP).  However,  the  ratio  of  outputs  to  a 
particular input is known as partial factor productivity (PFP) measure. With respect to TFP, the 
need  to  aggregate  outputs  and  inputs  becomes  apparent.  Associated  to  the  many  ways  of 
measuring  total  input  and  total  output,  are  the  different  methods  to  estimate  TFP.  Broadly 
speaking, two approaches have been used to measure TFP. In effect, one can distinguish between 
the parametric approach and the nonparametric approach. The two approaches differ in their 
assumptions with regard to the existence of a random error and efficiency. 
For the purpose of this study, the measure of productivity is the non-parametric (output oriented) 
Malmquist index as explained in Caves et al (1982), popularized by Fare et al (1992),  and used 
by Fulginiti and Perrin (1997), Pratt and Yu (2008) among others. 
In  the  next  three  sub-sections,  I  will  briefly  discuss  the  methodology  for  computing  the 
Malmquist index, describe the variables used, and finally specify the empirical models.  
2.1: The Malmquist Productivity Index 
I will define and decompose the nonparametric Malmquist productivity index, in accordance 
with Fulginiti and Perrin (1997).  The interested reader can refer to their article for a discussion 
of ideas in support of Malmquist index in productivity studies. 
The Malmquist index is a nonparametric and non-stochastic index used to measure productivity 
change between any two periods t and t+1. I will assume that countries can not alter their input 11 
 
endowment, and therefore I will adopt an output oriented Malmquist index, specified by Farel et 
al. (1994) as follows: 
Mo Xt+1, Yt+1,Xt,Yt  =  
Dt Xt+1,Yt+1 
Dt Xt,Yt  ∗
Dt+1 Xt+1,Yt+1 
Dt+1 Xt,Yt   
1/2                           (1) 
          
𝐷?+1 ??,? ?   represents  the  output  distance  from  the  period  t  observation  using  period  t+1 
technology. Equation (1) is the geometric mean of two indices. The first is evaluated with respect 
to period t technology, and the second with respect to period t+1 technology. A value of M0 
greater than 1 indicates a positive TFP growth from period t to period t+1, while a value less than 
1 indicates a decline. 
Farel et al. (1994) show that equation (1) can be rewritten as follows: 
Mo Xt+1, Yt+1,Xt,Yt  = 
Dt+1 Xt+1,Yt+1 
Dt Xt,Yt  ∗  
Dt Xt+1,Yt+1 
Dt+1 Xt+1,Yt+1  ∗
Dt Xt,Yt 
Dt+1 Xt,Yt  
1/2                     (2) 
This is nothing but the decomposition into efficiency change (measured by the ratio outside of 
the brackets) and technological change (represented by the part inside the brackets) components 
of the output oriented Malmquist index. This is an important property of the Malmquist index. 
The efficiency change component refers to the movement either closer or further away from the 
frontier. It reflects the improved ability (or lack thereof) of a country to adopt the available 
technology. The technical change component captures the effect of a shift in the production 
frontier as a result of technological advances. It reflects the innovations in the agricultural sector. 
As with the Malmquist index, values of the efficiency and technical change indices greater than 
unity indicate improvement in those components.   
To address the criticism inflicted on efficiency measures for lacking an error component that 
allows statistical inferences, Simar and Wilson (1998) propose a bootstrap method
10 to estimate 12 
 
confidence intervals for distance functions used to measure efficiency scores. Simar and Wilson 
(1999) extend the method to the case of Malmquist and its component indices. 
2.2: Data Description 
To calculate the Malmquist index and its two components, I use panel data on eight countries 
over  the  period  1970  -  2000.  The  list  of  the  countries  included  and  their  socioeconomic 
characteristics are presented in Table 1 below.  
Table 1: List of Countries and Their Key Socioeconomic Characteristics 


















% of Ag. 
Pop 
(1970) 













































































































I use one output and five input variables. The agricultural output is the quantity of agricultural 
production  measured  in  millions  of  1999-2001  international  dollars.  Labor  is  the  total  of 
economically  active  agricultural  population  in  thousands;  agricultural  land,  measured  in 
thousands of hectares, is the sum of arable land and permanent cropland; fertilizer is the quantity 
of fertilizer in metric tons of plant nutrient consumed in agriculture; machinery is the number of 
agricultural tractors in use. Livestock input variable is the cow-equivalent livestock units of three 13 
 
categories  of  animals.  The  categories  are:  horses,  cattle  and  camels.  Following  Hayami  and 
Ruttan (1985), the conversion factors are: 1.0 for horses, 0.8 for cattle, and 1.1 for camels. 
All the data are derived from the Food and Agricultural organization of the United Nations 
(FAOSTAT). 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Variable                         N                    Mean                         S.D.                          Max                        Min 
Crop Output               264                64.82                      22.35                     118.64                24.50 
Livestock output       264                848950                    599579                  2544237              30012 
Land                          264                2954.63                   3534.3                   145000                130 
Labor                         264                2069.40                   1457.33                  5161                    210 
Tractors                     264                415.83                      616.08                    2600                   13 
Fertilizers                  264                9056.80                    11707.35                50238                 100 
Temperature              264                26.82                        1.40                         29.40                 21.33 
Precipitation              264                 555.19                     387.91                     1755.34             67.08 
Livestock  input         264                2435887                   1617283                  6032300           185000                  
Irrigation                     264               3.43                           4.59                         25.00                0.13 
 
The summary statistics of the data used in the computation of the Malmquist index is presented 
in Table 2. The table indicates large variations in the output as well as the input variables across 
countries
11. 
After calculating the productivity index and its components, my next step is to examine factors 
explaining the debated agricultural productivity in Africa with particular emphasis on Sahelian 
countries and persistent drought. Based on past studies, the exp lanatory variables include such 
factors as institutions (Fulginiti et al. 2004), macroeconomic policies (Jaeger, 1991; Block, 1995; 14 
 
Towsend and Thirtle, 1998; Thirtle, Lin and Piesse, 2002; Alauddin, Headey and Rao, 2004), 
agricultural policies (Pratt and Yu, 2008), and environmental variables (Mendelsohn et al, 2000; 
Kurukulasuriya et al. 2007; Kabubo-Mariara and Karanja, 2007). This study concentrates on the 
effects of drought and temperature on agricultural productivity. The rainfall variable used in this 
study is a 6-month SPI (standardized precipitation index) which indicates the severity of a wet 
and a dry spell.
12  To the best of my knowledge, this paper is the first to compute and include SPI 
to study the impact of precipitation on agricultural productivity. This is an improvement over 
previous studies that used a dummy variable
13 to account for drought (Roncoli et al. 2001; Little 
et  al.  ,  2004)  or  assumed  without  accounting  for  it  the  role  of  weather  on  agricultural 
productivity (Block, 1995). However, unlike this paper, the objective of the previous studies is 
not to focus on the impact of drought. 
Temperature  is  the  second  variable  used  to  account  for  climate  conditions.  Well  respected 
agronomic studies
14 have documented the relationship between temperature and crop yields. For 
example, based on a field study in the Philippines, Peng  et al (2004) find that for each 1°C 
increase  in  growing-season  minimum  temperature,  grain  yield  decreases  by  at  least  10 
percentage points. 
For the purpose of this study, I use average temperature during the growing season which spans 
from May to October. 
The data on precipitation and temperature are from ARTES (Africa Rainfall and Temperature 
Evaluation System). 
The role of good governance in agricultural productivity has been established in the literature 
(Lio and Liu, 2008). Following Fulginiti et al (2004), the number of years since independence is 15 
 
included to account for the institutional factors.
15 The number of years since independence is 
collected from the Central Intelligence Agency world factbook.  
The investment share in GDP, a proxy for macroeconomic policy, is derived from the  online 
World Development Indicators. 
According to Pratt and Yu (2008), agricultural policy reform is one of the two key factors behind 
the improved performance of Sub-Saharan Africa’s agriculture. Their policy change indicator is 
an index adapted from Cleaver and Donovan (1995). Their index takes only two values: 1 and 4, 
with 1 indicating best policy. I used a modified policy index to account for performance in 
agricultural policy reforms. I construct the policy index using the annual growth rate of fertilizer 
consumption.
16  The  index  takes  on  the  value  of  1  if  a  country  has  a  negative  fertilizer 
consumption growth, a value of 2 if the growth rate if positive but less than 100 %, and a value 
of 3 if fertilizer consumption has increased by more than 100 % from one year to the next. 
Also, I include in the regressions a time trend to capture the effect of technological progress. I 
use the percentage of irrigated area in total land variable to measure irrigation, a proxy for land 
quality. To account for the size of a country, I use the gross domestic product. Lastly, given that 
the aforementioned macroeconomic expenditures may not have an impact on agriculture if they 
are biased toward the urban sector (Alauddin et al., 2004; Bezemer and Headey, 2008), I include 
the share of urban population as a measure of urban bias.  The last two variables are consistently 
statistically insignificant in all the regressions, so I drop the share of urban population from the 
regressions and I substitute GDP for per capita GDP, a proxy for income. 
2.3: Empirical Models 
Empirical  evidence  based  on  the  growth  of  input  and  output  reveals  that  the  dynamic  of 
agriculture in Sahel is hardly explained by the traditional input to production usually discussed in 16 
 
the literature. Both output growth and precipitation have been very volatile compared to input 
growth during the period from 1970 to 2000. In the face of this highly volatile precipitation 
pattern, one should ask whether agricultural sector can be sustained in Sahel. Pratt and Yu (2008) 
convincingly argue that in the face of resource constraints and increased pressure from rural 
population growth, the only possible way for agriculture to be sustained is through total factor 
productivity growth. In the next two paragraphs, I will make use of linear panel fixed effects and 
probit estimations to examine the factors behind the changes in total factor productivity in Sahel.  
2.3.1: Fixed Effects: 
I use the fixed effects  because the fixed effect estimator is  consistent  when the unobserved 
effects are correlated with the independent variables, but the random effect is not. Another raison 
for using the fixed effects model is that it further allows me to estimate a unit-specific effect for 
each of the eight countries in this study. Also, the fixed effects model will allow me to purge the 
effect of time invariant controls and other non-included time invariant factors from the model 
(Barrios et al. 2003). In addition to the variables presented in the data section, I also include 
some  lags  of  drought  and  precipitation,  reasoning  that  past  drought  events  can  worsen  land 
degradation
17, and that land degradation is linked to productivity (Wiebe, 2003).
18 
I develop the following analytical framework to study the impacts of droughts on agricultural 
productivity: 
𝑇𝐹𝑃?? = 𝗩? + 𝗩?? +  ?????? +   ??𝑃?? − ? +   𝜆?𝑇?? − ? +  ??? 𝑁
?=0
𝐿
?=0                                 (3)                                        
Where TFP is the growth of total factor productivity, 𝗩?  are country fixed effects, 𝗩?? are time 
fixed  effects,  X  includes  a  constant  term,  a  time  trend,  per  capita  GDP,  and  measures  of 
agricultural  policy,  the  number  of  year  since  independence,  investment  share  in  GDP,  and 
percentage of irrigated area in total land. (See the data appendix for details). The variable p is a 17 
 
6-month SPI (as explained in Boubacar, 2008), and T is the annual average temperature during 
the growing season.  
2.3.2: Probit Model 
The results of the fixed effects model explain the impacts of drought on the mean of TFP during 
the period of this study for the sampled countries. Disaggregated country level Malmquist index 
results indicate that more than half of the TFP values are less than unity. In other words, a 
declining TFP has been the norm rather than the exception in Sahel. In the context of continued 
population growth, food insecurity, and the predicted climate change, policymakers would like to 
identify  factors  behind  the  observed  productivity  losses,  and  to  take  appropriate  mitigation 
strategies. From a policy perspective, I believe that a marginal effect is more instructive than an 
average effect. 
Additionally,  from  a  theoretical  viewpoint,  some  authors  (Lobell,  Cahill  and  Field,  2007; 
Deschenes  and  Greenstone,  2007)  raise  the  concern  that  the  relationship  between  climate 
variables  and  crop  production  may  be  non-linear.  For  that  reason,  they  include  linear  and 
quadratic terms of their variables of interest in their model specification (see for example models 
based on the Ricardian approach).  
Finally drought is a risk to agricultural production. Thus, the existence of risk warrants the use of 
a probabilistic approach to quantify the impacts of climate change in agricultural productivity.  
Considering the aforementioned reasons, equation (3) can be reformulated to simultaneously 
capture the non-linear relationship  between climate variables and agriculture and allow it to 
account for the marginal position around a TFP of unity.  
The idea is best assessed using a probit model as follows 
P TFPit
∗ < 1 ⋮ ?  = P(Z < ( ?????? +   δjPit − j +   𝜆?𝑇?? − ?  𝑁
?=0  ) ) L
j=0                              (4)                                  18 
 
Where Z includes T, P and all the variables in X; and 
TFPit
∗ =  
1, 𝑇𝐹𝑃 change < 1
0, 𝑜?ℎ??𝑤???
                                                                                                        (5) 
I begin by estimating (3) and (4) with no lags, in order to test the hypothesis that climate does not 
affect productivity.  The test is described as follows: 
For drought, H0: δ0 = 0 and Ha: δ0 ≠ 0                                                                                    (6) 
For temperature, H0: λ0 = 0 and Ha: λ0 ≠ 0                                                                                    (7)  
If  statistical  evidence  suggests  that  the  null  hypothesis  is  rejected,  then  I  should pursue the 
regressions including current and lag climate variables. 
2.4: Panel Unit Root Test  
It has been argued that past studies arbitrary assume that the series involved in estimations are 
integrated of order zero. To break from the traditional assumption, I test the presence of unit root 
for each variables included in the regressions. Each series found not to be integrated of order 
zero must be differenced before the estimation. This unit root test is based on relatively new tests 
using a panel structure of all cross-section units. I carry out the panel unit root tests following 
Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003). The results suggest that I do not have enough statistical evidence to 
reject the null hypothesis that Investment, Irrigation and per capita GDP variables are integrated 
of order one. Therefore, I must difference those three series before proceeding to the regressions.  
III: Results: 
3.1: Malmquist Total Factor Productivity Index and its Decompositions: 
Even  though  the  focus  of  this  paper  is  to  study  the  impacts  of  change  in  precipitation  and 
temperature  on  agricultural  productivity,  it  will  be  insightful  to  first  analyze  how  TFP  has 
evolved in Sahel since 1970. Figure 2 shows the evolution of the growth rates of TFP and its 
component indices. With few exceptions, the variations of technical change closely mimic that of 19 
 
TFP change. The trend is characterized by erratic fluctuations with respect to TFP change and 
technical change.   
Figure 2: Trend in TFP change and its Components over time (Sahel) 
 
 
In contrast, Table 3 suggests an overall positive trend in the region with respect to technical 
efficiency  change.  On  the  average,  the  weighted  technical  efficiency  has  increased  by  0.63 
percent per year for the entire set of countries. Yet, the performance varies across countries. For 
example Burkina  Faso  and Senegal  have experienced an  average  change  above the regional 
average, while Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Niger show virtually no change in efficiency. On 
the average, technical efficiency seems not to be an obstacle to Sahelian countries in achieving 
high performance in agricultural productivity. Pratt and Yu (2008) reach a similar conclusion as 
well. 
The average technical change for all the eight countries and the weighted average value for the 













































































weighted  average  decline  of  0.99  percent  annually  for  the  region.  However,  countries  like 
Guinea Bissau and Niger have experienced a relatively big increase in technological change.  
The first column of Table 3 reports the average Malmquist productivity index for each country, 
and the weighted average index for the region. It appears that the weighted average Malmquist 
index has declined by 0.947 percent annually. Recall that, from equation 2, TFP can be increased 
by either improving technical efficiency or technological level, or both. But the analysis of the 
component measures of TFP change reveals that technical efficiency has not improved enough to 
offset  the  decline  in  technological  change.  In  order  words,  for  the  region,  agricultural 
productivity is seriously impeded by the lack of technological change. In explaining the causes 
of  productivity  growth  differential  between  the  tropical  regions  (which  are  technologically 
deficient)  and  the  temperate  regions  (innovators),  Bloom  and  Sacks  (1998)  argue  that 
agricultural technologies do not transfer well across ecological zones.  
Only three countries (Gambia, Mali and Senegal) report gains in productivity. Additionally, I 
identify three countries as the worst performers in that they record not only a dismal productivity 
change, but also a negative trend in both component measures of TFP change. Those countries 
are Guinea Bissau, Mauritania and Niger. In fact, they are the same countries that exhibit no 
changes in efficiency. The remaining two countries (Burkina and Chad) that experience declines 
in productivity show an improvement in efficiency, but not large enough to offset the loss in 
technological change. A similar pattern is also observed at the regional level with the weighted 
average results. There is no country with concomitantly a productivity gain and an improvement 
in both efficiency change and technical change. These results of negative trends are in sharp 
contrast with the findings by  Lusigi and Thirtle (1997) who report an improvement in both 
technical change and efficiency change for the 47 Sub-Saharan African countries included in 21 
 
their study sample. The results of Table 3 offer an insight into the state of the agricultural sector 
in Sahel. The poor agricultural productivity performance spins from the lack of innovation rather 
than the adoption of the available technology.  
Table 3: Average rates of Malmquist TFP change and its Components 
Countries  Total factor Productivity 
Change (TFPC) 




  Lower 
Bound 








TC  Upper 
Bound 
Burkina   0.9299  0.9784  1.0298  1.00793  1.0079  1.01593  0.9267  0.9841  1.0316 
Chad  0.9424  0.9849  1.0437  0.99623  1.0021  1.00413  0.9259  0.9836  1.0307 
Gambia  1.0119  1.0206  1.1206  0.99482  1.0014  1.00271  0.9240  0.9827  1.0286 
Guinea 
Bissau  0.9492  0.9885  1.0512  0.99213  1  1  1.0195  1.0322  1.1349 
Mali  0.9874  1.0082  1.0935  0.99889  1.0034  1.00681  0.9198  0.9804  1.0239 
Mauritania  0.8394  0.9296  0.9296  0.99213  1  1  0.8433  0.9388  0.9388 
Niger  0.8952  0.9599  0.9914  0.99226  1.0001  1.00013  1.0450  1.0450  1.1633 
Senegal  1.0295  1.0295  1.1401  0.8558  1.0217  1.2247  0.9078  0.974  1.0106 
Sahel  0.9531  0.99053  1.0554  1.0046  1.0063  1.0126  0.9381  0.9901  1.0443 
 
With respect to TFP change, my results corroborate the findings by Trueblood and Coggins 
(2003) who report productivity losses in five of the six Sahelian countries included in their study 
sample. Additionally Nin and Yu (2008), in analyzing the role of restrictions on shadow price 
used in DEA estimates, find Sub-Saharan Africa to perform well. However, on a country-by-
country analysis, their result reveals that 5 of the 7 Sahelian countries in their study show a 
decline in TFP change regardless of the approach used. Along the same line, Coelli and Rao 
(2005) use the Malmquist index approach to study the agricultural productivity in 93 developed 
and  developing  countries.  Three  of  the  four  Sahelian  countries  included  show  a  decline  in 
agricultural productivity from 1980 to 2000. Moreover, the country with the least TFP growth 
and technical change is a Sahelian country. In contrast, other studies have found a positive TFP 
growth.  For  example,  Pratt  and  Yu  (2008)  find  an  improvement  in  Sub-Saharan  African 22 
 
agricultural productivity. Their results suggest an average of 1.80 percent growth from 1964 to 
1983, with 1972 and 1983
19 being the worst years. According to the authors, the period of 1984 
to 2003 was characterized by an unprecedented growth of 3.2 percent per annum. But, their 
regional results show evidence that Sahel is the least performer amongst the groups. They 
attribute this performance to improved efficiency in the production process and to a better policy 
environment implemented in most African countries since the mid-80s.   
Grouped by decade, TFP change and its component indices are presented in Figure 3. It appears 
that the region has experienced a productivity loss in the 1970s (2.55 percent), a rebound in the 
1980s (1.82 percent), and a substantial decline in the 1990s (11.03 percent). Similarly, Block 
(1995) finds a significant improvement in productivity during the 1980s.   
A decadal analysis of the African agricultural productivity growth by Fulginiti  et al. (2004) 
shows a slight difference in the pattern observed in this study. For example, they find a negative 
growth in the 1970s (-0.32), a rebound in the 1980s (1.29) and an even higher performance in the 
1990s (1.69). The mixed results from a decadal analysis can also be found in the study by Pratt 
and Yu
20 (2008). They find a negative TFP growth in 1964 -73 (-0.99) and 1974-83 (-0.55) 
followed by two decades of improvement in 1984-93 (0.89) and 1994-2003 (1.48).  
I highly suspect the worst performance observed during the 1990s to be indicative of the 
cumulative  effects  of  the  1980s’  drought.  This  hypothesis  is  tested  using  probit  regressions 






Figure 3: Average Annual TFP changes and its Components by Decades 
 
 
3.2: The Probit Results: 
In the words of Edward Frees (2004, page 11), “longitudinal data models in and of themselves 
are insufficient to establish causal relationships among variables”.  
The  Malmquist  productivity  indices,  as  discussed  in  section  3.1,  highlight  the  existence  of 
productivity differential both across and within countries in Sahel. Moreover, the values of TFP 
growth  less  than  unity  appear  to  be  the  characteristics  of  the  output.  Thus,  with  a  skewed 
distribution,  the  analysis  of  the  mean  value  of  TFP  change  (done  with  TFP  change  as  a 
continuous dependent variable in the case of linear fixed effects in sub-section 2.3.1) is not 
appropriate. Additionally, during those years or to those countries on the edge of efficiency (TFP 
growth marginally greater or less than unity), a slight difference between a drought year and a 
wet year would significantly be pivotal. The question that one may ask is what are the countries’ 
characteristics  that  could  explain  the  difference  in  agricultural  productivity  performance  in 
Sahel? And part of the motivation of this paper is to investigate how changes in climate variables 24 
 
affect agricultural productivity. Specifically, my aim is to explain the extent to which persistent 
droughts have been a causal factor decreasing agricultural productivity in Sahel. Angrist (1999) 
convincingly  argues  that  causal  relationships  (with  dichotomous  dependent  variable),  unlike 
descriptive  analyses  (with  continuous  dependent  variable),  not  only  answer  counterfactual 
questions,  but  are  more  of  value  for  predicting  the  effects  of  changing  circumstances  or 
understanding  the  past.  For  the  specific  case  of  Sahel,  the  past  has  been  colorful  in  severe 
droughts, and this environmental state is predicted to continue in the future because of global 
warming (numerous reports of IPCC).  
For all the aforementioned reasons, my preferred specification is the probit regressions.  
For robustness check, I estimate several specifications of equation (4). 
I begin by estimating equation (4) with only drought and its lags as climate variables. 
The results are presented in Table 4. It appears that agricultural policy, investment share in GDP, 
the  number  of  years  since  independence  and  the  time  trend  variables  all  have  significant 
influence on TFP change. A 1 percent increase in investment share of GDP is associated with 93 
percent  chance  of  TFP  growth  being  greater  than  one.  This  strong  relationship  between 
investment and productivity is particularly interesting. The positive impacts of investment on 
economic growth have well been documented in growth literature. As pointed out by Rao et al 
(2004), government expenditures in education, health, provision of infrastructure, agricultural 
research and development have the potential to improve productivity through better adoption of 
existing technology and more access to new technology. With respect to this paper, the point 
made by Rao et al. is reinforced by the significance and the magnitude of the coefficient on the 
time trend variable, a proxy for technological change. Not surprisingly, the results of TFP and its 25 
 
components  reveal  that  the  challenges  are  more  of  technological  constraints  than  efficiency 
issues. 
Following Fulginiti et al (2004), I use the number of years since independence as a proxy for 
institutions. My results indicate that the longer is the independence period, the higher is the 
probability that the growth rate of TFP falls below 1. In contrast, Fulginiti et al (2004) find that 
productivity tends to decrease during the first 12 years of independence, and increases thereafter 
(their sample includes  Nigeria and Tanzania, two countries with large agricultural base, and 
whose inclusion biases the productivity of SSA, as shown by Nin and YU (2008). Also, their 
sample includes countries like Ghana that are believed to be “long-standing reformers” (Bloom 
and Sachs, 1999). Additionally, using agricultural output as their measure of productivity and an 
aggregate indicator of governance as their proxy for institutions, Lio and Liu (2008) find support 
for better governance in generating higher agricultural productivity. 
The irrigation  variable is  not  statistically significant.  This  is  not  surprising as  irrigation and 
investment may be correlated. Investment, here, refers to public investment and irrigation is also 
a form of investment by the government in the rural areas where most of the poor farmers live. 
Additionally, as pointed out by previous studies, and also supported by Table 2, irrigation is not 
widespread in Sahel, and therefore one can argue that it has a minimum (if any) impact  on 
agricultural productivity.  
The  coefficient  on  the  drought  variable  is  negative  and  statistically  significant.  Though,  the 
coefficient should be interpreted with caution because drought index takes positive and negative 
values centered on zero. A positive SPI indicates wet spells, and a negative SPI means drought. 
My results show a quite significant positive effect of precipitation on productivity. Block (1995) 
has partly attributed the African agricultural recovery observed in the 1980s to good weather 26 
 
conditions. In contrast, Fulginiti et al. (2004) do not find drought to have a negative impact on 
agricultural productivity in SSA. Their sample includes arid, semi-arid and wet regions of Africa. 
Scientific evidence (Bates et al. 2008) suggests that global warming will intensify the occurrence 
and the severity of droughts in Sahel.  
Table 4: Marginal Effects of Drought and its lags on P(TFP change < 1) 
Variables  Drought  1 lag  2 lags  3 lags 










































































L3-drought        0.0145 
(0.346) 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate that the parameter is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The t-ratios are in parenthes. 
 
For  what  will  follow,  I  consider  models  with  lags  in  order  to  grasp  the  dynamics  of  the 
interaction between droughts and agricultural productivity. 27 
 
In doing so, I will examine not only the current effects but also the carryover effects of climate 
on productivity. The length of lags to include will be determined by a “tatonnement process”, as 
there is no prior study of distributed lag models with an application to drought and productivity.   
With respect to drought, beyond the first year, the coefficient estimates of the lag variables are 
not statistically significant. This means that rainfall conditions in a giving year will affect the 
productivity during that year and the following year. With one lag included, the cumulative 
effect of drought is positive. This means that TFP will fall with two or more years with drought.  
In a second alternative specification, I estimate equation (4) with temperature and its lags. 
Table 5: Marginal Effects of Temperature and its lags on P(TFP change < 1) 
Variables  Temp  1 lag   2 lags  3 lags  4 lags 


































































































L4-Temp          -0.0982 
(-1.254) 
L5-Temp           
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate that the parameter is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The t-ratios are in parentheses. 28 
 
Table 5 shows the results of the impact of temperature on TFP growth. Statistically, current 
temperature has no effect on productivity. This is an indication that the main cultivated crops in 
Sahel (Millet, sorghum) are heat tolerant. Previous studies have shown mix results on the impact 
of temperature on agriculture. For example, exploring the interaction between climate, water and 
agriculture, Mendelsohn and Dinar (2003) find that warming is slightly harmful to US farmers; 
but with climate variance terms, warming turns slightly beneficial. 
The coefficient estimates on lag one, lag two and lag three are statistically significant with a 
cumulative strong effect on productivity. In particular, the cumulative effect of a 1° C increase in 
temperature is associated with an increase in the probability of TFP growth falling by 12.94 
percentage points after three years.  
The separate effects of drought and temperature on productivity persist even when both climate 
variables  are  simultaneously  included  in  the  regression  (See  Table  6  below).  However, 
temperature appears to have longer-lasting effects than drought. My results contrast the findings 











Table 6: Marginal Effects of drought, Temperature and their lags on P(TFP change < 1) 




































































































L3-Temp        0.198 
(2.229)** 
L3-drought        -0.0248 
(-0.545) 
LLF  -158.96  -150.40  -148.05  -145.26 
Pseudo R2  0.0709  0.1209  0.1347  0.1510 
Notes: *, ** and *** indicate that the parameter is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 






IV: Drought and Economic Growth in Sahel: 
The development literature evokes several factors to account for a nation’s economic growth. 
Using  Bayesian  averaging  of  classical  estimates,  Sala-i-Martin  et  al  (2004)  investigate  the 
explanatory power of 67 variables historically included in the growth regressions. Their sample 
covers a cross section of 88 countries over the period from 1960 to 1996. They find that 18 of the 
67 variables are “significantly and robustly partially correlated with long-term growth”, and that 
3 other variables are “marginally related”.  And furthermore, their results identify 3 variables, 
namely the relative price of investment, the initial level of real GDP per capita and primary 
school enrolment, which show the strongest correlation with long term growth.   
Recent debate has identified the combination of both domestic and external factors to account for 
the causes of Africa’s growth disaster. But, as pointed out by Barrios et al (2003), the evidence 
of their importance is mixed. Nonetheless, “there should be no doubt that the worst economic 
disaster of the XX
th century is the dismal growth performance of the African continent…It is 
dismal in absolute terms, but it is worse if we take into account that, during the same period, the 
rest of the World has been growing at an annual rate of close to 2 percent”, Artadi and Sala-i-
Martin (2003). 
Although there is evidence in support of the explanations put forward to account for Africa’s 
economic debacle,  I strongly believe,  along with   Barrios,  Bertinelli and Strobl,  (2003) and 
Bloom and Sachs (1998),  that the distinct climatic conditions in most African countries have put 
solid obstructions to their economic growth. The immediate consequences of the harsh climatic 
conditions are a low agricultural productivity, high diseases and low life expectancies (Bloom 
and Sachs, 1998). 31 
 
This section reviews and discusses the evidence of the impact of drought on Sahelian countries’ 
economic growth over the period from 1970 to 2000. The timeframe is long enough to give an 
overview  of  the  relationship  between  agricultural  productivity  and  economic  growth  before, 
during and after drought years in some heavily agrarian countries. Benson and Clay (1998) argue 
that the severity of the impacts of drought depends on the economic environment. In an economy 
of subsistence with rain-fed agriculture and an almost inexistent infrastructure as is the case in 
the Sahel, the impacts of drought on the economy may be particularly devastating. For example, 
GDP growth did not recover from the 1970s as a consequence of drought in Sahel (Sanders et al. 
1996). The situation is seriously alarming because of the importance of the agricultural sector in 
the overall economy. For instance, Pinstrup-Andersen, Lundberg and Garrett (1995) show that 
through the multiplier effects, each additional dollar from farm income adds $ 2 to $ 3 to the 
overall  economy  in  Sub-Saharan  Africa.  As  I  stress  it  earlier,  in  Sahel,  agriculture  depends 
heavily on rainfalls, and many authors
21 (Bloom and Sachs, 1998; Collier and Gunning, 1999; 
O’Connell and Ndulu, 2000) suggest that the decline in precipitations may have played a key 
role in the economic debacle of the region. Thus, an ill agricultural sector will drag down the 
entire economy.  
To alleviate poverty, it is important to both accurately identify the target and use the appropriate 
mechanisms.  I  do  believe  that  demographic  and  economic  factors  as  discussed  in  previous 
studies  do  matter  in  explaining  Africa’s  low  economic  performance.  However,  I  put  more 
emphasis on climate variables for a number of reasons. For one thing, little will be gained in just 
revising what have been presented in past studies. And more importantly, as pointed out by 
Bloom and Sachs (1998), Africa’s natural environment (climate, soil, and diseases) is at the 
forefront of all the obstacles to growth faced by the continent.  32 
 
 4.1: Data and Model 
Two distinct strategies have been traditionally pursued when estimating growth regressions. The 
first approach, also known as “Barro-type”, consists of cross-section regressions of GDP growth 
rates on initial values or long- term averages of some potential regressors (Barro, 1991; Bloom 
and Sachs, 1998); and the second approach is based on panel regressions (Grier and Tullock, 
1989; Easterly and Levine, 1997). Both approaches have their merits and their shortfalls. For 
example,  cross-section  regressions  permit  the  inclusion  of  larger  country  samples  and  a 
comprehensive set of explanatory variables. On the other hand, panel estimations control for 
omitted variables and unobservable country-specific effects, which is not possible with cross-
section models. 
My sample includes eight countries (see Table 1), using data spanning from 1970 to 2000. Thus, 
I find the advantages of using panel estimations more appealing. The empirical framework is 
described as follows:  
 𝑔it = 𝗩? + 𝗩?? +  ?????? + ???? +  𝜆𝑇?? + ?𝑇𝐹𝑃?? +  ???                       (8) 
With i = 1, 2, …8 and t = 1970, …2000 
Where 𝑔it is the growth rate of real per capita GDP (RPGDP), 𝗩?  are country fixed effects, 𝗩?? 
are time fixed effects, dit is the 12 month-SPI, Tit is the average annual temperature, TFPit is the 
TFP change from year t-1 to year t, Xit includes control explanatory variables such as the price of 
investment goods (following Sala-i-Martin et al , 2004), and institutional variables (war and 
polity 2, following Collier and Gunning, 1999 to account for policy dispersion within Africa), 
and ε?? is an error term.  
One can argue that the burden of the struggle is mostly borne by the agricultural population that 
happens  to  be  the  rural  population.  According  to  the  International  Fund  for  Agricultural 33 
 
Development (2001), 75 percent of the poor live in rural areas, and more than 60 percent will 
continue to do so in 2025. For the poor in developing countries, agricultural is the primary source 
of  employment  and  daily  livelihood.  To  capture  the  incidence  of  climate  change  on  rural 
populations, equation (8) is re-estimated using the growth rates of real per capita agricultural 
GDP (RPAGDP) as the dependent variable. 
The data on real per capita GDP and the price of investment goods are derived from the Penn 
World Table. The productivity variable is the agricultural Malmquist TFP change computed in 
section 2 above. The RPAGDP data are derived from the online World Development Indicators. 
The  SPI  drought  index  is  calculated  using  monthly  precipitation  data  from  ARTES.  The 
temperature variable is also from ARTES.   
4.2: Results 
Using fixed effects robust estimation, I first regress the annual growth rates of real per capita 
GDP on temperature and drought. The results are shown in the first column of Table 7 – Panel A. 
Overall,  the  model  has  a  good  explanatory  power,  and  explains  a  very  large  portion  of  the 
dependent variable. From the individual results piece-wise, it appears that climate variables have 
significant  effects  on  economic  growth  in  Sahel.  In  particular,  drought  is  positively  and 
statistically related to economic growth. A 1 unit improvement in the drought index in a given 
year increases the rate of real per capita GDP growth in that year by 2.32 percentage points. This 
result echoes previous findings on the beneficial effects of precipitation on economic activities, 
especially in countries dependent on rainfall. For example, Barrios et al. (2003) find precipitation 
to be statistically significant only in the sample of African countries. In contrast, Dell et  al. 
(2008) find no statistical evidence of the impact of precipitation on GDP growth in neither poor 
nor rich countries.  34 
 
The coefficient estimate on temperature variable is negative and statistically significant. A 1° C 
higher temperature produces a 0.962 percentage point reduction in real per capita GDP growth, 
ceteris paribus. Almost a similar magnitude is found by Dell et al (2008) for poor countries. In 
Sahel,  a  tropical  region  per  excellence,  temperature  is  almost  always  very  high,  with  little 
difference between the minimum and the maximum (see Table 2). Bloom and Sachs (1998) 
convincingly argue that Africa’s disadvantageous climatic conditions (tropical regions) are the 
main cause of its impoverishment.  
For robustness check, I also include a set of control variables, as explained in the data section. As 
mentioned above, one goal of this paper is to investigate the impact of drought and temperature 
on the economic growth in Sahel, and not to re-examine the previously discussed theories in 
development economic. Hence, the results regarding the control variables are not discussed here, 
but reported in the second column of Table 7- Panel A, where the results of the variables of 
interest  are  also  reported.  It  appears  that,  of  the  control  variables,  only  war  is  statistically 
significant,  and  with  a  very  large  negative  effects  on  growth.  One  should  also  notice  the 
estimates of my variables of interest remain stable both in terms of magnitudes and statistical 
significance.  
Table 7- Panel B re-considers the specification of equation 9 using the growth rates of real per 
capita agricultural GDP (RPAGDP) as the dependent variable. Three observations stand out from 
comparing the results in Panel B to those in Panel A. 
First, the effects of climate variables are more pronounced on RPAGDP than RPGDP. This result 
confirms and strengthens the hypothesis that climate change has a devastating impact on the 
agricultural sector in Sahel.  35 
 
Second, the positive coefficient for TFP change becomes statistically significant, indicating how 
an increase in agricultural productivity enhances the welfare of rural populations.  
Third, this point is common to both results in Panel A and Panel B. It appears that economic 
(expressed in terms of RPGDP or RPAGDP) is more influenced by changes in precipitation than 
temperature,  ceteris  paribus.  Specifically,  a  1°  C  higher  temperature  is  associated  with  1.25 
percentage points lower growth in real per capita agricultural share in GDP. Dell et al. (2008) 
attribute this effect to labor productivity losses. As for precipitation, a 1 unit improvement of the 
drought  index  is  associated  with  3.58  percentage  points  higher  growth  in  real  per  capita 
agricultural  share  in  GDP.  This  effect  may  help  explain  the  adverse  impacts  of  persistent 
droughts in Sahel. This third point is in sharp contrast to the finding by Kurukulasuriya et al. 
(2007)  who  support  that  dryland  farmers’  revenues  are  more  affected  by  an  increase  in 















Table 7: Economic Growth and Drought Nexus in Sahel 
Panel A              Panel B 
   
Dependent variable: Real Per Capita 
 GDP Growth Rate 












TFP    1.585 
(0.867) 
Investment    0.00134 
(0.252) 
War    -4.238 
(-2.582)** 
Polity2    0.0715 
(1.129) 












Dependent variable: Growth Rate of Real  
Per Capita Agricultural Share in GDP  












TFP    5.30 
(1.72)*** 
Investment    0.0605 
(0.311) 
War    -3.77 
(-2.17)** 
Polity2    -0.109 
(-0.98) 











Notes: *, ** and *** indicate that the parameter is significant at 1%, 5% and 10% levels, respectively. 
The t-ratios are in parentheses. 
 
V: Conclusion 
In  this  paper,  the  agricultural  productivity  performance  is  assessed  using  a  non-parametric 
Malmquist  index.  My  results  show  that  the  performance  of  Sahel’s  agriculture  has  been 
disastrous. From 1970 to 2000, agricultural productivity has declined at an average annual rate of 
0.947  percentage  points.  However,  all  the  countries  do  not  follow  the  same  pattern  in 
productivity performance. Three of the eight countries stand out as relatively the best performers, 




Nin and Yu (2008) who also find negative trends in TFP growth with respect to the Sahelian 
countries included in their paper.  
Using  a  comparable  cross-country  measure  of  drought,  I  provide  evidence  that  precipitation 
variability  is  constraining  agricultural  productivity  growth  in  Sahel.  Persistent  droughts  and 
increase in temperature have significantly hampered the performance of Sahel’s agriculture. 
Lastly, I examine the effects of chronic droughts and high temperature on the annual growth 
rates of real per capita GDP and the annual growth rates of real per capita agricultural GDP in 
Sahel.  My  results  indicate  that  the  harsh  climatic  conditions  are  an  impediment  to  Sahel’s 
economic growth.  
Sahel is predicted to experience more droughts in conjunction with the effects of global warming 
(IPCC, 2001). Therefore, policymakers should take steps to reduce the sensitivity to rainfall of 
the exposed countries. For example, the agricultural system needs to incorporate more irrigation 
technique.  Alternatively,  the  path  to  economic  development  should  drift  more  towards 
manufacturing and service sector exports (as suggested by Bloom and Sachs, 1998) rather than 
the promotion of the agricultural sector.   
The results of this study can be used by policymakers and the international community who are 
looking for ways to address the Sub-Saharan Africa’s poverty trap. I highlighted factors that 
have hindered Sahelian economic performance over the period from 1970 to 2000. The most 
terrifying part is that scientific evidence predicts that those factors will increase in intensity over 
years  to  come.  By  identifying  those  factors,  this  paper  provides  a  giant  step  capable  of 




desire.  Further  work  is  needed  to  identify  the  length  of  lags  of  drought  and  temperature  to 




1 Based on 2008 FAO data 
2 The two regions have their own shares of very poor countries where the economic situation is 
comparable to what is prevailing in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
3 Sahel is part of West African region 
4 Carswell (2000) as cited by Aune and Bationo (2008) noted that agricultural development has three 
characteristics: Extensification, labor-led intensification and capital-led intensification 
5 IPCC stands for Inter government Panel on Climate Change 
6 The first important point of Table 1 is that the share of agriculture in GDP remains very high 
throughout the period of this study, with the exception of the two recently oil-producing countries 
(Chad and Mauritania).  
 
7 And most certainly not from 1981 to 1984 
8 Measures as precipitation net of evapotranspiration (evaporation and transpiration during 
photosynthesis) 
9 I also run an alternative estimation using real per capita agricultural GDP growth rates 
10 That builds on a bootstrap procedure introduced by Efron (1979) 
11 In general, the growth in output exhibits much more volatility than the growth of input, suggesting the 
existence of other forces driving the agricultural production besides the traditional input used in the 
literature. 
12 See Boubacar (2008) for details regarding drought indices.  
13 The problem with a dummy variable is that it represents any other variables not accounted for in the 
regression. Ideally, more important variable must be included explicitly in the estimation.  
14 See McKeown, A.W.; Warland, J.  and McDonald, M.R. (2006) for a throughout review of the 
agronomic literature on the relationship between temperature and grain yields.  
15  In alternative specifications, I use war intensity variable, collected from Armed Conflicts Version 4, 
2008. The variable was consistently statistically insignificant. 
16 Agricultural policy reforms can take the forms of incentives to farmers in order to use high yield-
enhancing seeds, increase fertilizer consumption, or access to irrigation. 
17  Wiebe (2003) defines Land degradation as changes in the quality of soil, water, and other 
characteristics that reduce the ability of land to produce goods and services that are valued by humans. 
  
18 However, this study does not intent to model the link between land quality and agricultural 
productivity. 
19 Those two years are remembered as severe drought years in most African countries. 
20 The values reported here exclude Nigeria as its inclusion further magnifies the results. 
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